CAMPAIGN FINANCE AFTER
MCCAIN-FEINGOLD
WHEN “THE POLS MAKE THE CALLS”: MCCONNELL’S THEORY
OF JUDICIAL DEFERENCE IN THE TWILIGHT OF BUCKLEY
†
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INTRODUCTION

This Article analyzes the component parts of “judicial deference”
1
as set out in McConnell v. Federal Election Commission, and assesses their
interrelationship and persuasiveness. Part I locates McConnell within
the history of struggles over the proper role of courts and legislatures
in the constitutional design and oversight of campaign finance controls. It attempts to show how the Court could not settle on a consistent account of its role, or Congress’s, in the application of the ration2
ale in Buckley v. Valeo for controlling campaign finance. With the
advent of McConnell, the Court seeks to construct a way out for itself,
built around Congressional “expertise” in striking the required constitutional balance.
Part II more fully evaluates the theory of judicial deference articulated by the McConnell Court, with particular reference to the Court’s
uses of: 1) history; 2) the notion of legislative “expertise;” 3) appeals
to “political realities;” and 4) Congress’s imperative need, in light of
those realities, to address actual or predicted circumvention. This
construction of deference suffers from an internal conflict that eventually undermines its persuasiveness: it functions as an escape from
the rigors of Buckley, but at the same time Buckley, and more specifically the assumed exclusivity of the corruption rationale, defines its
theoretical limits. The Court must ground its justification of defer-
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ence in narrow and highly debatable claims about history, political
realities and the nature of legislative expertise as they relate, and only
as they relate, to the problem of corruption. The deference theory
therefore stands and falls on the nature of these shaky historical and
empirical claims. In this light, Part II also attempts to explain the
Court’s neglect of the legislative history of the Bipartisan Campaign
3
Reform Act of 2002 (BCRA).
I. FROM BUCKLEY BACK TO BURROUGHS, VIA MCCONNELL
The Court’s opinion in McConnell is effectively tucked between
4
two citations to Burroughs v. United States. In 1934, the Burroughs
Court endorsed a broad reading of congressional authority to “pre5
serve the purity of presidential and vice presidential elections,” concluding that Congress possesses the power to “safeguard” elections
6
“from the improper use of money.” The McConnell Court, at the beginning of its lengthy opinion, cites this particular portion of the Burroughs opinion: “the choice of means to that end [protecting against
improper financial activity in elections] presents a question primarily
7
addressed to the judgment of Congress.” The Burroughs Court had
elaborated still more on this theme, as follows:
If it can be seen that the means adopted are really calculated to attain
the end, the degree of their necessity, the extent to which they conduce
to the end, the closeness of the relationship between the means adopted
and the end to be attained, are matters for congressional determination
8
alone.

The McConnell Court’s attention to Burroughs does not appear to
be a mere attachment to florid early twentieth century judicial rhetoric. For with its reference to Burroughs, opening and closing its analysis of the congressional role in establishing the constitutional boundaries of campaign finance, the Court unmistakably suggests that it is
striking out in a new—or, considering the age of Burroughs, a very
old—direction. What follows confirms first impressions. An understanding of how significantly McConnell alters the relations of the judi-

3

Pub. L. No. 107-171, 101, 116 Stat. 81, 82 (codified at 2 U.S.C.A. § 441i(a)
(Supp. 2003)).
4
290 U.S. 534 (1934).
5
Id. at 544.
6
Id. at 545.
7
McConnell, 124 S. Ct. at 644 (citing Burroughs, 290 U.S. at 547).
8
Burroughs, 290 U.S. at 547-48.
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cial and legislative branches requires some attention to how these relations were treated, explicitly or implicitly, in Buckley and its progeny.
A. Judicial Deference in Buckley and Its Aftermath
Buckley did not simply rest on broad declarations about which
campaign finance matters were best left to “congressional determina9
tion alone.” Like the McConnell Court, the Buckley Court did not chal10
lenge Congress’s baseline authority to regulate federal elections.
And the Buckley Court, in its discussion of that authority as it affects
the regulation of presidential and vice presidential elections, also cites
11
to Burroughs. Yet the manner in which it developed its position was
distinctly unBurroughs-like. The Buckley Court strove to develop a relatively complex constitutional architecture, articulating general princi12
ples to guide the courts in the conduct of judicial review. Most centrally, this judicial framework included the acceptance of the
constitutional sufficiency of one “compelling interest” asserted by the
government, but also the rejection of two others. Working from the
anticorruption interest that the court of appeals recognized as “com13
pelling,” the Supreme Court drew a distinction between “contributions” and “expenditures” that conflicted with a congressional scheme
14
of limits on both.
Even as the Buckley Court sustained the congressional position and
upheld the limits on contributions as consistent with First Amendment guarantees, it did not do so in deference to empirical congres-

9

See id. at 548 (emphasizing Congress’s particular expertise in selecting the best
means to protect federal elections (citing Stephens v. Binford, 287 U.S. 251, 272
(1932)).
10
See Buckley, 424 U.S. at 13 (stating that Congress’s constitutional power to regulate federal elections is well established).
11
See id. at 14 (citing Burroughs generally as a recognition of Congress’s power to
legislate in connection with federal elections).
12
See id. at 14-23 (discussing when financial transactions include elements of
speech protected by the First Amendment and when important government interests
may justify regulating that speech).
13
Id. at 10 (citing the lower court’s decision, 519 F.2d 817, 841 (D.C. Cir. 1975)).
14
Noting the costs of modern communication, which rise with the size of the target audience and the number of issues discussed, the Court found that limiting “expenditures” would pose significant restraints on free speech by reducing the “quantity
of expression.” Id. at 19. On the other hand, restricting “contributions” would only be
a slight restraint on free speech since the expression is dependent almost entirely on
the act of giving, rather than the quantity of the gift. Id. at 20-21.
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sional judgment about the practical effects of such controls.
The
Court arrived at its own conclusions: “There is no indication . . . that
[limits on contributions] would have any dramatic adverse effect on
16
the funding of campaigns and political associations.” Similarly, the
Court set out its own assessment of the impact of these finance restric17
tions on challengers. The references the Court does make to congressional judgments are brief and indiscriminately stated, not expanded into a coherent statement of the relative role of the two
branches in the construction of constitutional campaign finance controls. For example, over three pages, the Court states that
“Congress could legitimately conclude” that avoidance of the appear18
ance of corruption was critical to public confidence in government;
that
“Congress was surely entitled to conclude” that disclosure could not
19
alone address this appearance problem; and that
“Congress was justified” in concluding that prophylactic measures,
reaching some contributions not corrupt in purpose or effect, were
20
nonetheless required to guard against corruption.

In the first instance, Congress’s conclusion was judged to be “legitimate,” which is not an expression of judicial deference. In the
second instance, Congress is said to be “entitled” to its conclusion
about the inadequacy of disclosure in addressing corruption, although
the basis on which it is so entitled, and the scope of the entitlement,
are unstated. And finally, in stating that Congress was “justified” in
the adoption of prophylactic measures, the Court is suggesting that
Congress’s position was reasonable—reasonable, that is, as the Court

15

The Court endorsed the government’s “primary” interest in preventing corruption, or its appearance, associated with large unregulated political donations. The
government had also argued for contribution limits on the basis of “ancillary interests”
in the “relative ability of all citizens to affect the outcome of elections” and in limiting
“skyrocketing” campaign costs. Id. at 25-26. Rejecting the “ancillary interest” in political equality as a basis for limiting independent expenditures, the Court famously repudiated “the concept that Government may restrict the speech of some elements of
our society in order to enhance the relative voice of others . . . .” Id. at 48-49.
16
Id. at 21.
17
See id. at 32-33 (finding that contribution limits would not discriminate against
challengers as a class because challengers are often well-known politicians with the
ability to accumulate sizable campaign coffers).
18
Id. at 27.
19
Id. at 28.
20
Id. at 30.
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has independently judged the matter upon review of the record and
examination of political realities.
In any event, the actions of the Court speak for themselves. The
Court picked over the Federal Election Campaign Act (FECA) of
21
1971, as amended, steadfastly invalidating expenditure limitations,
which were of considerable significance to Congress’s overall plan for
controlling campaign finance. The Court, in fact, acknowledged the
meticuluous adjustment it made to Congress’s handiwork. Declining
to consider a claim that the “overall effect” of the statute was to protect incumbents, the Court noted that it need not consider the “full
sweep of the legislation as enacted” because it had stripped the law of
22
key expenditure limitations.
In the aftermath of Buckley, the Court did not develop a consistent
theory of appropriate judicial intervention or deference to guide its
review of congressional campaign finance restrictions. The Court
merely attempted, case by case, to determine whether Congress had
imposed controls consistent with its sole “compelling interest” in the
23
prevention of the fact or appearance of corruption. In the early
1980s, the Court seemed to accept that Congress could extend regulation of campaign finance to guard against “circumvention,” even
where the activities regulated did not present a direct threat, in and of
themselves, of corruption or its appearance. In California Medical Ass’n
24
v. FEC, the Court articulated that era’s version of the “anticircumvention” theory of today: Congress, it held, could regulate certain activities as “an appropriate means by which Congress could seek to protect
the integrity of the contribution restrictions upheld by this Court in
25
Buckley.” On this basis, the Court sustained a limit on contribu26
tions to a multi-candidate political committee, to “supplement” Congress’s more immediate concern with contributions made by such
27
committees directly to candidates. Later, in FEC v. National Right to

21

Pub. L. No. 92-225, 86 Stat. 3 (1972) (codified as amended at at 2 U.S.C. §§ 431455 (2002)).
22
Buckley, 424 U.S. at 31 n.33.
23
See id. at 26-27, 45, 53 (1975) (finding a “constitutionally sufficient justification”
in the purpose of limiting “the actuality and appearance of corruption resulting from
large individual financial contributions”).
24
453 U.S. 182 (1981).
25
Id. at 199.
26
Id. at 201 (upholding “the $5,000 limitation on the amount that persons
may contribute to multicandidate political committees” contained in 2 U.S.C.
§ 441a(a)(1)(c)).
27
Id. at 201.
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28

Work Committee (NRWC), the Court sustained Congress’s adoption of
a “prophylactic” rule that prohibited a membership organization’s use
of corporate funds to solicit contributions for its political action
committee, which was established to make direct contributions to
29
candidates.
Only a few years later, the Court appeared to retreat somewhat
from its constitutional blessing of useful enforcement supplements
and “bright-line” rules to support Congress’s anticorruption mission.
30
In FEC v. Massachusetts Citizens for Life, Inc. (MCFL), the Court rejected an appeal by the FEC for a bright-line rule in enforcing the
31
corporate spending prohibition against a nonprofit right-to-life organization that financed the production and distribution of a voting
32
record. The Court was apparently troubled by the facts, most notably the ideological character of the “corporation” that funded its ac33
tivities on a modest scale with only individual contributions. The
Court then designed an exception, dramatically legislative in character, for independent election-related spending by certain types of
34
nonprofit ideological corporations. Congress had made no such dis35
tinction. In fact, section 44lb of FECA, by its terms, reflects an
awareness of the different types of corporations, such as national
banks and corporations chartered by act of Congress. Congress did
not elect to include any exemption of the kind crafted by the Court in
MCFL.
The Court was similarly suspicious of the limitation imposed by
Congress on independent expenditures in support of publicly funded
presidential candidates.
In FEC v. National Conservative PAC

28

459 U.S. 197 (1982).
Id. at 210.
30
479 U.S. 238 (1986).
31
See 2 U.S.C. § 441b (prohibiting corporations from using treasury funds to make
expenditures “in connection with” any federal election and requiring that any expenditure for such purpose be financed by voluntary contributions to a separate segregated fund).
32
MCFL, 479 U.S. at 263.
33
Id. at 264 (noting that the organization was “formed for the express purpose of
promoting political ideas, and cannot engage in business activities,” and that it was the
organization’s “policy not to accept contributions from” business corporations or labor
unions).
34
Id. at 264 n.13 (“Our decision today merely states that a corporation that does
not have persons affilliated financially must fall outside of § 441b’s prohibition on direct expenditures if it also has the other two characteristics possessed by MCFL that we
discuss in text.”).
35
2 U.S.C. § 441b.
29

2004]

WHEN “THE POLS MAKE THE CALLS”

11

36

(NCPAC), the Court rejected what it dismissed as “a hypothetical
37
possibility” of quid pro quo corruption associated with independent
expenditures by well-connected and well-funded groups with ties to a
38
presidential candidate’s campaign. The Court also affirmed the district court’s rejection of the proffered evidence consisting of public
opinion polling data that purported to show that these types of expenditures would compound public cynicism about the role of money
39
in politics—that is, the appearance of corruption.
MCFL and NRWC could be viewed as a logical extension of the
Buckley command that the Court take special care to review congressional limits on expenditures. The mid-l990s brought another example of this kind, when the Court considered an enforcement action
40
brought under the party “coordinated spending limitations.” In the
41
first Colorado Republican case, the Court concluded that parties could
spend without limitation on behalf of their candidates so long as they
42
did so “independently.” None of the parties in the case had offered
this theory, and FEC regulations had flatly precluded “independence”
43
of a candidate from his or her own party. Swayed by the fact that the
party’s spending occurred prior to the nomination of, or in coordina44
tion with, a candidate, the Court found no basis for a potential of
45
“corruption” that would justify the application of limits. Any such
46
suggestion of “corruption,” the Court claimed, was too “attenuated.”
The Court was untroubled by any prospect of “circumvention,”
through claims of “independence” of the coordinated spending lim36

470 U.S. 480 (1985).
The Court defined quid pro quo corruption as “dollars for political favors.” Id.
at 497; see also Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 26-27 (1975) (“To the extent that large
contributions are given to secure a political quid pro quo from current and potential
office holders, the integrity of our system of representative democracy is undermined.”).
38
NCPAC, 470 U.S. at 498.
39
Id. at 499-500.
40
See 2 U.S.C. § 441a(a)(2) (subjecting, ordinarily, a party’s coordinated expenditures to the $5000 limitation). Coordinated expenditures are defined as “expenditures
made . . . in cooperation, consultation, or concert, with, or at, the request or suggestion of, a candidate, his authorized political committees, or their agents.” 2 U.S.C. §
441a(a)(7)(B)(i).
41
FEC v. Colo. Republican Fed. Campaign Comm. (Colorado Republican I)., 518
U.S. 604 (1996)
42
Id. at 608.
43
11 C.F.R. § 109.32 (2004) (defining “coordinated party expenditure limits”).
44
Colorado Republican I, 518 U.S. at 614.
45
Id. at 616.
46
Id.
37
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47

its. Neither direct application of the anticorruption rationale, nor
the anticircumvention theory advanced by cases like California Medical
48
Ass’n, could save the spending limitation at issue in the case.

B. McConnell Foreshadowed: The Shrink Missouri and Colorado
Republican II Cases
The turn of the century brought about a distinctive turn in the
Court’s post-Buckley jurisprudence—a turn away from Buckley and toward a new articulation of the role of the Court and of the legislature.
The Court made much of deference to legislative judgments in Nixon
49
v. Shrink Missouri Government PAC. In Shrink Missouri, the plaintiffs
had challenged the limit established by the Missouri legislature for
contributions to candidates, which ranged from $275 to $1075 accord50
ing to the office sought. Their complaint was that the state had
made no effort to support the limits with evidence of potential cor51
ruption or its appearance. Yet the Court, acknowledging that Missouri did not preserve legislative history, decided the case on deference to the legislative judgment about the need for limits and their
52
amounts. The Court returned to the NCPAC case, citing it for the
proposition that it would not “second-guess a legislative determination
as to the need for prophylactic measures where corruption is the evil
53
feared.” While the legislature would presumably have to have some
grounds for the imposition of limits, the “quantum” of such evidence
“will vary up or down with the novelty and plausibility of the justifica54
tion raised.” The Court insisted that Buckley had not established a
55
minimum requirement of any kind. In the case at hand, the Court
concluded, the personal views of a legislator and an assortment of

47

Id. at 617-18.
See id. (declining to find that “a limitation on political parties’ independent expenditures is necessary to combat a substantial danger of corruption of the electoral
system”).
49
528 U.S. 377 (2000).
50
Id. at 383.
51
Id. at 390-91.
52
Id. at 393-94.
53
Id. at 391 n.5 (citing NRWC, 459 U.S. 197, 210 (1982)).
54
Id. at 391.
55
Id. at 397 (“In Buckley, we specifically rejected the contention that $1,000, or any
other amount, was a constitutional minimum below which legislatures could not regulate.”).
48
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newspaper articles reflecting allegations of public corruption amply
56
supported the state enactment.
In a concurring opinion, Justice Breyer, joined by Justice Ginsburg, more fully developed the theory of “deference” on which the result rested. In a statement that foreshadowed the McConnell majority’s
jurisprudence, Justice Breyer suggested that the legislature had a role
in establishing the “difficult” balance between “constitutionally pro57
tected interests . . . on both sides of the legal equation.” The legislature could claim that role on the basis of its “expertise”: “Where a legislature has significantly greater institutional expertise, as for example,
in the field of election regulation, the Court in practice defers to empirical legislative judgments—at least when that deference does not
risk such constitutional evils as, say, permitting incumbents to insulate
58
themselves from effective electoral challenge.”
Breyer did not say more about the source of the expertise, except
to state that “the legislature understands the problem—the threat to
electoral integrity, the need for democratization—better than do we.
We should defer to its political judgment that unlimited spending
59
threatens the integrity of the electoral process.” Justice Breyer suggested that this doctrine was compatible with the Court’s holding in
60
Buckley, though this is doubtful. Moreover, it is striking that Breyer
would refer to Congress’s recognition of the threat of unlimited
“spending,” when it was precisely “spending” limits that the Buckley
Court had found to require the closest judicial scrutiny.
The question of the viability of Buckley’s distinction between contributions and expenditures, in the light of notions of “deference” to
Congress, was raised again the following year. The Court upheld
the “coordinated” party spending limits against a facial challenge, with
61
Justice Souter once again writing for the majority. The Court rejected
the significance of the contribution/expenditure distinction for the
resolution of the case, and the manner in which it did so previews the
McConnell view of the world. The Court in Colorado Republican II in-

56

Id. at 393-94.
Id. at 399-400 (Breyer, J., concurring).
58
Id. at 402.
59
Id. at 403-04.
60
See id. at 404-05 (asserting that Buckley “might be interpreted as embodying sufficient flexibility for the problem at hand”).
61
FEC v. Colo. Republican Fed. Campaign Comm., 533 U.S. 431, 437 (2001)
(Colorado Republican II).
57
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sisted that the distinction was not formal, but “functional.” Congress
was entitled to look behind campaign finance practices to judge their
corruptive potential or appearance, or their effect on its ability to enforce the law—to anticipate and address circumvention. Courts had
to make room for generally practical approaches to the issues raised
by campaign finance: approaches grounded in “political life” and po63
litical reality. While not stated specifically, this practicality, even realism, was seen as Congress’s special forte. Presumably this was the
64
source of the expertise justifying judicial deference.
C. McConnell and the Triumph of “Deference”
McConnell wove the themes of Shrink Missouri and Colorado Republican II into a frontally argued theory of deference to the legislative
branch in matters of campaign finance regulation. As in Shrink Missouri, legislative history plays virtually no role in the Court’s consideration of Congress’s constitutional purposes. In fact, the Court notes
65
that BCRA was enacted with “little” legislative history. The Court
does not, therefore, ground its deference to Congress on a showing
Congress made in support of enactment. The Court defers more broadly
on the basis of the following four features of Congress’s engagement
with campaign finance: history, expertise, political realities, and enforcement of the law.

62

See id. at 438 (“The simplicity of the distinction [between contributing and
spending] is qualified by [FECA’s] provision for a functional, not formal, definition of
‘contribution . . . .’”).
63
See id. at 452 n.14 (noting “Congress’s concern with this reality of political life,”
that contributors give with an expectation of return).
64
The Court also placed some emphasis on deference in FEC v. Beaumont, 539 U.S
146 (2003), decided only months before McConnell, in which it sustained the constitutionality of the prohibition on corporate contributions as applied to contributions by
nonprofit advocacy corporations. Yet this case turned more narrowly on the specific
doctrine supporting restrictions on corporate political activity. See id. at 155 (“In sum,
our cases on campaign finance regulation represent respect for the ‘legislative judgment that the special characteristics of the corporate structure require particularly
careful regulation.’” (quoting NRWC, 459 U.S. 197, 209-10 (1982)). Moreover, the
Court stressed that its holding took into account the Buckley distinction between contributions and expenditures. See id. at 161-62 (citing Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 20-21
(1976) (per curiam)). As explained in this Part, the more broadly gauged doctrine of
deference emerging from Shrink Missouri and Colorado Republican II, and brought to full
muster in McConnell, operates to dissolve the distinction between the two.
65
McConnell, 124 S. Ct. at 681.
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1. History
The McConnell opinion opens with a review of Congress’s history
of amendment over the course of the last century of the federal cam66
paign finance laws. While Congress may now be enacting broad
controls on soft money, these actions, as the Court views them, must
be seen as incremental steps, resulting in “steady improvement” over a
67
period of years. In this sense, it appears that Congress has earned
the measure of deference offered: it has proceeded cautiously and responsibly, systematically fine-tuning the laws to achieve consistent improvement in their effectiveness. Thus the Court states: “We respect
Congress’s decision to proceed in incremental steps in the area of
68
campaign finance regulation.”
2. Expertise
In matters of campaign finance, members of Congress are considered to have “vastly superior knowledge” on topics such as the role of
parties and their relationship with officeholders. The court recognized
this expertise by implementing a heightened rather than strict scru69
tiny standard of review.
3. Political Realities
The consideration of “political realities” appears closely related to
70
the expertise attributed to Congress. Members of Congress must be
credited, as political experts, with knowing “how things really work.”
Yet the Court appears sometimes to offer its own appreciation of “political realities,” separate and apart from that of the expert class of
officeholders. In any event, the focus on political realities serves the
Court’s purpose in avoiding formalistic distinctions between “contri66

See id. at 643-48 (outlining the history of federal campaign finance reform).
Id. at 645.
68
Id. at 669 (citations omitted).
69
See id. at 656 n.39 (“[R]egulations of contributions to candidates, parties, and
political committees are subject to less rigorous scrutiny than direct restraints on
speech . . . .”).
70
See, e.g., id. at 665-66 (stating that Congress has a regulatory interest in “realities
of political fundraising” that may “give rise to corruption and the appearance of corruption”); id. at 674 (affirming “Congress’ judgment that if a large donation is capable
of putting a federal candidate in the debt of the contributor, it poses a threat of corruption or the appearance of corruption”); id. at 686 (“Congress is fully entitled to
consider the real-world differences between political parties and interest groups when
crafting a system of campaign finance regulation.”).
67
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butions” and “expenditures,” for, as the Court in Colorado Republican II
suggested, the line between the one and the other may blur in practi71
cal application or in the cold light of political realities.
4. Enforcing the Law by Addressing and
Anticipating Circumvention
The Court sees Congress as entitled to enforce its laws by anticipating and combating different, evolving, and novel means of corruption through appropriate measures. This ground for deference is
related to the history of congressional involvement with campaign finance, for Congress has been required to root out all manner of evasion of the law. In fact, following Colorado Republican II, the Court
wraps this concern with circumvention into the concern with corruption. Citing Colorado Republican II, the McConnell Court finds that “cir72
cumvention is a valid theory of corruption.” Congress may attend to
actual corruption and also act on “predictions” of where it might next
73
take place.
These are the component, and in some ways overlapping, parts of
the case made by the McConnell Court for judicial deference. Taken
together, it can be seen how they support a sharp departure from a
concern, formal in nature, with the difference between contributions
and expenditures. The emphasis on practical politics—on the history
and “realities” of political life—enables the Court to conclude that soft
money solicitation and spending limits are an appropriate and even
necessary means of enforcing contribution limits. Thus “[a]s with direct limits on contributions, [party and candidate soft money] spending and solicitation restrictions have only a marginal impact on politi74
In this way, contribution and expenditure limits
cal speech.”
become functionally the same. In this way, also, it can be readily seen
that the McConnell theory of judicial deference is incompatible with
Buckley.

71

Colorado Republican II, 533 U.S. 431, 464 (2001).
McConnell, 124 S. Ct. at 661 (quoting id., at 456).
73
See id. at 673 (noting that Congress “made a prediction [in enacting FECA §
323(b)] . . . [h]aving been taught the hard lesson of circumvention by the entire history of campaign finance regulation . . .”).
74
Id. at 658. The Court elsewhere refers to spending and solicitation restrictions
as “mechanism[s] adopted to implement the contribution limit . . . .” Id. at 657. It is
fair to say that expenditure limits have been knocked off their once high constitutional
perch when, in this context at least, they are mere enforcement “mechanisms.”
72
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II. EVALUATING MCCONNELL “DEFERENCE”
A. The Problems with Deference in a Buckley Framework
In evaluating McConnell deference, it is helpful in the first instance
to identify the kind of deference it is not propounding. The Court
does not advance the proposition that competing constitutional values
in campaign finance derive from the First Amendment, with the Court
charged with monitoring traditional free speech concerns while Congress sought to vindicate that aspect of the Amendment concerned
75
Nor does the
with ensuring a more robust democratic dialogue.
Court offer a highly developed notion of the democratic implications
76
of deference, such as that recently advanced by Richard Hasen. In
Hasen’s version, Congress might lay claim to deference to its vision,
even a highly contested vision, of the proper balance between equality
77
and other constitutional values. The Court would remain responsible for policing the selection of means to achieve this end—screening,
for example, for evidence of legislative self-interest or other illicit mo78
tives. As Professor Hasen sees it, this framework would encourage
experimentation in the political marketplace. Errors would be corrected by experience, and Congress would take care with the articulation of means and ends with the knowledge that the courts were
79
watching.
The Court in McConnell eschews any bold strokes of this kind, and
instead seeks to mold its theory of deference within the space allowed
by Buckley. This is a fateful move, leaving the Court with only the anticorruption rationale to support its assertion of Congressional authority. This rationale compromises Congress’s claim to “deference” in a
way that competing theories, like Hasen’s, do not. It does so in two
major respects.

75

This robust dialogue might consist of a “diversity of views, orderly presentation
and intelligent deliberation, enhanced opportunities for the self-expression of individual citizens who lack wealth, and substantial political equality.” Lillian R. BeVier,
Money and Politics: A Perspective on the First Amendment and Campaign Finance Reform, 73
CAL. L. REV. 1045, 1070 (1985) (citations omitted). It is fair to say that Professor
BeVier does not think much of this “competing values” analysis, but she correctly identifies the line of argument advanced by those who do.
76
RICHARD L. HASEN, THE SUPREME COURT AND ELECTION LAW (2003).
77
See id. at 101-37 (describing campaign finance as a conflict between equality and
liberty).
78
See id. at 102 (promoting a theory of contested political equality measures).
79
Id. at 117, 119.
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First, the Court’s appeal to expertise is placed under serious strain
by the narrow reliance on the anticorruption rationale in proclaimed
fealty to Buckley. By definition, officeholders legislating to avert corruption are addressing their own conduct. As McConnell notes repeatedly, BCRA as an anticorruption statute is concerned with the actions
of officeholders, in relation to donors and to their parties—the same
officeholders, that is, who designed the statute. We normally are
skeptical of laws designed by those who, seeking to correct their own
conduct, engage in a form of “self-checking.” By contrast, in a theory
of deference grounded, for example, in legislative articulation of
competing theories of equality, we have politicians doing what they
are expected to do—expressing a view of democratic participation
and governance. While we might be concerned with the possibility of
covert motives in the execution of this program, the issue of selfinterest does not dramatically dominate the foreground.
The problem is not simply that, in a critique of their own involvement with political money, officeholders may be tempted to rig the
game for their own purposes. There is also the fair possibility that,
even if they do the best they can, their biases will taint, if not wholly
disqualify, the effort. The McConnell plaintiffs made this point by noting that Congress provided special allowances for themselves in soft
80
money fundraising that they denied to the parties, and by enacting
higher contribution limits and protections against the misfortune of
81
drawing a millionaire opponent. Congress may embark on this legislative venture with the best of intentions, only to produce a statute
that hardly escapes the pull of self-interest. In these conditions, an
argument based on “expertise” rings hollow, particularly to the ears of
political interests and entities adversely affected by the legislative outcome.
Second, there is the problem that by grounding deference in the
Buckley framework, the Court must find a way to expand the conception of “corruption” or its appearance to accommodate the comprehensive range of actions that Congress might consider necessary.
BCRA is not concerned with vote-buying, or any of the more coarse
and familiar forms of “sale of office,” but rather corruption that “is

80

National parties, for example, cannot raise soft money for election-related
charities, while officeholders can within specially designed limits but without public
disclosure requirements. Compare 2 U.S.C. § 441i(d) (denying national parties the ability to raise soft money for election-related charities), with 2 U.S.C. § 441i(e)(4) (permitting officeholders to raise soft money for election-related charities).
81
McConnell, 124 S. Ct. at 669; see also U.S.C. §§ 441a(a)(1), 441a(a)(3),441a(i).
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neither easily detected nor practical to criminalize,” or that is “subtle
82
but equally dispiriting.” A form of “corruption” that is both “subtle”
and not “easily detected” presents an elusive target for regulation. It
presents the still more immediate question of who, and with what degree of authority, might determine its presence or occurrence. The
Court seeks to solve the problem by an appeal to Congress’s expertise—its experience with political reality, demonstrated over time.
Congress, in effect, earns its right to deference by showing that
over many years, in a “steady improvement” of the election laws, it has
displayed a resolute, carefully targeted concern with the corruption
83
problem. This is the source of its expertise, but more importantly, it
is also the basis for any reassurance that Congress can rise above the
84
lure or trap of self-interestedness.
This means that the Court’s case for deference rests on its persuasiveness, that is, on the power of its presentation of “realities”
and “history.” Yet the McConnell Court’s history of Congressional intervention in campaign finance is superficial and incomplete. The
Court offers up a sort of heroic “official history” as Congress would
have written it. A more probing examination reveals a different history than the one presented by the Court—one characterized by partisan motivations and political self-interest rather than simply “steady
85
improvement” in the attack on corruption. Moreover, the “political
realities” within which Congress is operating include a structure of political competition, barely considered by the Court, that is heavily
weighted in the interests of, and shaped by, the individual candidate—particularly the incumbent candidate.

82

McConnell, 124 S. Ct. at 666.
See id. at 643-45 (discussing the history of the election laws and characterizing it
as Congress’s “steady improvement of the national election laws”).
84
The Court gives only summary attention to the dissent’s critique of Title I of
BCRA as a statute that “look[s] very much like an incumbency protection plan.” Id. at
753 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). The majority replies simply that any concern about
Congress’s self-interest “is taken into account by the applicable level of scrutiny.” Id. at
684 n.72 (majority opinion). According to the Court, Congress is held in check by
having to show “concrete evidence” of corruption, or its appearance, arising from “a
particular type of financial transaction,” and by having to adopt means “closely drawn”
to solve the problem. Id. Of course, the Court’s reassurances are negligible, undermined by its decision to “defer” broadly to congressional choices. The Court’s analysis
reflects few demands on Congress for “concrete evidence,” in large measure because it
chooses to defer to the legislature’s “conclusions” and “predictions” about the existence of corruption and the means of dealing with it. Id. at 672.
85
Id. at 645.
83
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The nature of this unofficial history and reality bears some attention because it illuminates the weakness of the foundation on which
the Court seeks to establish its theory of deference. This is not to say
that a theory of deference is not imaginable or sustainable, but that
the Court’s attempt to construct one in McConnell, in an awkward relationship to Buckley, does not succeed. It does not succeed because
a theory of deference tied to Buckley is doomed from the start. The
Court is seeking to escape the imagined rigors of Buckley through a
theory of deference, but by insisting on operating within the Buckley
paradigm of the danger of corruption, it builds the theory on a
theoretical foundation that cannot support it. In short, the history of
campaign finance reform is by no means a straightforward history of a
“resolute” concern with corruption, and that history does not support
the claims made by McConnell for congressional “expertise.”
In its analysis of “history” and “political realities,” the Court’s refusal to consider the history of the very enactment under review,
BCRA, underscores the problems with its theory of judicial deference.
The Court minimizes interest in the legislative history of BCRA itself,
86
declaring that there is “little” of it. Yet there is more legislative history than the Court is willing to admit, spanning weeks of debate in
the Senate and an intense day and night of debate in the House, and
it is hard to see how a theory of deference that takes history seriously
87
would overlook it. Even if Congress had established the historical
record claimed for it by the Court, there is always a question of
whether legislators have proven faithful to that record in this instance.
While it cannot be known why the Court would ignore the history of
the enactment before it, there is a basis for the question of whether
the majority knew that it was unhelpful to its cause: that it would not
support “deference” on the basis of Congress’s attention to the dangers of corruption under the Buckley framework.
B. The Unofficial History
As noted above, the Court views the history of campaign finance
reform as one of “steady improvement” in the law achieved by congressional concern with ever-evolving corruption threatened by the
88
The changes made are appropriately
role of money in politics.
86

Id. at 681.
See infra notes 127-139 and accompanying text (discussing the legislative history
of BCRA).
88
See supra text accompanying note 83; McConnell, 124 S. Ct. at 634.
87
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“cautious” and incremental, as Congress proceeds deliberately to adjust regulation with some precision to the fulfillment of its anticorrup89
tion goals.
On its face, this might seem like a fairly simplified, if not glorified,
version of how legislation of any kind is made. It is all the more questionable as an account of Congress’s engagement with campaign finance reform. Rather than illustrating a Congress objectively pursuing the cleansing of political life, campaign finance reform history
reveals a series of highly partisan disputes over the control of political
resources. The “Congress” enacting reforms typically does so from
90
distinct partisan or self-interested perspectives. We need not judge
one or the other side harshly to accept the highly politicized character
of reform legislation over the last century.
Reform history opens with a decisive change in the country’s
politics, when the “mass democracy” centered on parties gave way to
increasingly expensive, candidate-centered appeals to voters that re91
quired intensive fundraising and expenditures. With the enactment
of the Seventeenth Amendment, relocating the election of Senators
from state legislatures to popular choice at the polls, the stresses occasioned by the change in the structure of political competition became
92
ever more acute. Parties traded accusations over fundraising practices, and President Theodore Roosevelt’s celebrated support for the
93
corporate spending prohibition, the Tillman Act, followed accusations directed against substantial corporate support for his own presi94
dential campaign. As Robert Mutch has shown, partisanship influ-

89

McConnell, 124 S. Ct. at 645 (citing NRWC, 459 U.S. 197 , 209 (1982)).
It is important not to limit the consideration of self-interest to “partisanship,”
since in an age of weak parties, individual legislators might exhibit self-interest on
some occasions by supporting measures beneficial to parties, and on others, by enactments helpful to incumbents as a class.
91
See, e.g., MICHAEL E. MCGERR, THE DECLINE OF POPULAR POLITICS: THE AMERICAN NORTH 1865-1928 (1988) (outlining the change in the country’s political process).
92
See Jay S. Bybee, Ulysses at the Mast: Democracy, Federalism and the Sirens’ Song of the
Seventeenth Amendment, 91 NW. U. L. REV. 500 (l997). Bybee notes how “proponents [of
the Seventeenth Amendment] had perhaps overlooked that statewide races conducted
to the electorate rather than to the legislature would prove far more expensive . . . and
the need for money could only encourage the influence of corporations and political
machines.” Id. at 541.
93
Pub. L. No. 59- 36, 34 Stat. 864 (1907) (codified as amended at 2 U.S.C. § 441b
(1988)).
94
See ROBERT E. MUTCH, CAMPAIGNS, CONGRESS AND THE COURTS: THE MAKING
OF FEDERAL CAMPAIGN FINANCE LAW 1-4 (1988) (outlining the evolution of campaign
finance law in the twentieth century). Mutch has produced the only comprehensive
90
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enced both the shape and success of most of the subsequent “im95
provements” debated by the Congress, such as the original Federal
96
Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA).
Yet the legislative jockeying over the Tillman Act and the FCPA
does not capture the full partisan flavor of the early wrangling over
campaign finance reform. Congress, acting pursuant to its constitu97
tional authority to judge the returns of its Members, entertained and
acted through the investigative process on allegations of campaign fi98
nance violations. Louise Overacker, writing about this process, welcomed whatever measure of enforcement it afforded, but lamented
the “tendency” of many cases to “become . . . more and more illdisguised attempts to make political capital. Composed as they are of
partisans operating in the heat of a campaign, it would be stranger if it
99
were otherwise.” She noted that the Senate, in enforcing primary
spending limits, simply adopted “whatever standards it chooses to apply at the particular time and for the particular candidate”—an exam100
These investigations
ple of “special legislation with a vengeance.”
produced reports of their findings and conclusions that are replete
101
In some instances, such as the
with evidence of partisan conflict.
celebrated challenge to the 1918 Senate election of Truman New-

treatment of the history of campaign finance reform, and any student of this period is
fortunate to be able to consult his work.
95
Democrats, particularly Southern Democrats, resisted the restoration of regulation to primary campaigns previously invalidated by the Supreme Court in Newberry v.
United States, 256 U.S. 232 (1921), but were actively concerned with the superior
sources of Republican financing. They were open to spending limits and pre-election
reporting. Republicans advocated regulation of primaries, and sought to maneuver
the Democrats into public embarrassment on disclosure issues. See MUTCH, supra note
94, at 8-16.
96
Federal Corrupt Practices Act of 1925, 43 Stat. 1070 (1925).
97
See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 5, cl. 1 (“Each house shall be the Judge of the Elections,
Returns and Qualifications of its own Members . . . .”).
98
The FCPA did not establish an independent civil enforcement mechanism and
the law did not in any event reach primaries in the wake of Newberry. For a general review of the enforcement “cases” heard by the Senate, see ANNE M. BUTLER & WENDY
WOLFF, GPO, UNITED STATES SENATE ELECTION, EXPULSION AND CENSURE CASES 17931990 (1995).
99
LOUISE OVERACKER, MONEY IN ELECTIONS 286 (1932).
100
Id. at 284.
101
See, e.g., REPORT OF THE SPECIAL COMMITTEE, INVESTIGATION OF PRESIDENTIAL,
VICE-PRESIDENTIAL, AND SENATORIAL CAMPAIGN EXPENDITURES, REP. NO. 79-101, at 8384 (l945) (noting the sharply divergent views between the majority and minority over
the treatment of the union spending, with the minority decrying “the problem of labor
unions in partisan politics,” while the majority defends their right to participate in the
“free discussion of political questions”).
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berry, the candidate’s fortunes rose and fell with changes in party con102
trol of the Senate.
This partisan coloration persisted throughout the balance of twen103
tieth-century reform. The l940 Hatch Act, limiting political activities
involving federal government workers, was designed by Republicans
and anti-New Deal Democrats to undermine President Roosevelt’s
104
Congress was careful in
campaign for nomination to a third term.
this statute to exempt from coverage state government workers “who
105
were still an important source of congressional campaign funds.”
President Roosevelt vetoed the bill, but Congress, overriding the veto,
enacted the restrictions into the law. A presidential veto, subsequently
overridden by Congress, also followed enactment of the Smith106
Connally Act in l943 which added a prohibition on labor election107
related spending to the 1907 Tillman Act.
108
Reforms later in the century follow the same pattern, with the
possible exception of the l974 amendments to the Federal Election
102

Newberry’s seat, the “control” seat in a closely divided Senate, was bitterly contested along party lines over excessive expenditures on Newberry’s behalf. Republicans reported in Newberry’s favor to the Senate, over Democratic objections, and the
Republican-controlled Senate seated him. When the l922 election reduced the Republican majority, shifting functional control to Democrats and “independent” or “radical”
Republicans, it became clear that the Democrats would seek again to remove him, and
likely succeed. Newberry then resigned in the face of the inevitable. See generally
SPENCER ERVIN, HENRY FORD VS. TRUMAN H. NEWBERRY: THE FAMOUS SENATE ELECTION CONTEST (l935). Ervin strongly criticizes the process by which Newberry was
driven from the Senate, but his account, while partial in this fashion, is rich in detail
about the politics of the case.
103
See Act of July 19, 1940, Pub. L. No. 76-753, § 4, 54 Stat. 767, 767 (codified as
amended at 5 U.S.C. § 1502 (1982)), (amending Hatch Act, Hatch Act, Pub. L. No. 76252, 53 Stat. 1147 (1939) (codified as amended at 5 U.S.C. §§ 1501-1503, 7324-7327
(1982 & Supp. III 1985); 18 U.S.C. §§ 594, 595, 598, 600, 601, 604, 605 (1982))).
104
MUTCH, supra note 94, at 32-33.
105
Id. at 34.
106
Smith-Connally Act, §9, 57 Stat. 167-68 (1943) (terminated 1946).
107
See MUTCH, supra note 94, at 154. Republicans and Southern Democrats
sought to work around the hostile territory of the Labor Committee, which would
normally have considered this legislation. The bill was assigned instead to Military Affairs, which held no hearings, but “assigned it to a specially appointed subcommittee
consisting entirely of Republicans and Southern Democrats.” Id. at 153-54. The bill
was then moved into typescript, without prior distribution, to the floor where “virtually
no one in the chamber knew what was being debated.” Id. at 154.
108
Mutch notes how even the New York Times expressed concern over the Democrats’ sudden embrace of public financing in l971, in the aftermath of the l968 presidential election that left the party in deep debt with limited prospects for raising
money. Id. at 121. Moreover, the l971 law placed specific limits on spending for
broadcast media, inspired by Democratic resentment of President Nixon’s purportedly
unprecedented use of Madison Avenue advertising techniques as related in a best
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109

Campaign Act of l971, which was enacted in the shadow of Water110
It should be apparent that the actual history of the war on
gate.
“corruption” does not correspond very neatly with the pristine account of the McConnell Court.
C. The “Political Realities”
The McConnell Court also offered a view of the relevant “political
realities” centered on the corruptive potential, effect and appearance
111
of money in the political process. Its examples included “manipulations of the legislative calendar” that are claimed to have resulted in
“Congress’ failure to enact, among other things, generic drug legisla112
Yet the Court chose a
tion, tort reform, and tobacco legislation.”
very partial view of the realities bearing on any evaluation of campaign
finance reform. Other prominent realities, treated cursorily by the
Court, involve the efforts of elected officials to protect themselves politically (in a period of sharply increasing campaign costs and weak political parties) and doing so successfully (reflected in incumbent reelection rates). In short, these are the realities of the contemporary
political marketplace. Some would say that these realities have been
well established, much better established than the sweeping generali113
zations the Court justified in the name of “common sense.” As a result, these realities provide a background to the enactment of BCRA
much different than the one highlighted by the Court.
seller entitled The Selling of the President 1968. JOE MCGINNISS, THE SELLING OF THE
PRESIDENT 1968 (l969). Thus, House Subcommittee Chairman Torbert MacDonald
opened hearings on the law by describing its purpose as one of ending “abuse of the
broadcasting media by candidates for public office” through “saturation” communications campaigns that sold them like “soap, razor blades, or soft drinks.” Bills to Regulate
the Use of Communications Media by Candidates for Elective Public Office: Hearings on H.R.
8627, H.R. 8628 Before the Subcomm. on Communications and Power of the House Comm. on
Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 92d Cong. 1 (l971) (statement of Representative Torbert
H. MacDonald, Chairman, House Subcomm. on Communications and Power).
109
Federal Election Campaign Act Amendments of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93- 443, 88
Stat. 1263 (1974) (amending Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971, Pub. L. No. 92225, 86 Stat. 3 (1972) (codified as amended at 2 U.S.C. §§ 431-56 (2003))).
110
The vote on the l974 amendments was still strongly affected by partisan divisions. A motion to recommit in the House, though defeated, received considerable
Republican support with the vote of 243-164. The margin widened considerably on
final passage, 355-48, but this vote was held in the extraordinary environment of the
day before President Nixon’s resignation from office. H.R. 16090, 93d Cong., 120
CONG. REC. 27512-13 (1974)(enacted).
111
McConnell, 124 S. Ct. 624, 665 (2003).
112
Id. at 664.
113
Id. at 665.
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A fair assessment of those realities would have to include reference to the generally increased cost of campaigning, not merely the
“explosion” in the amount of soft money. As Alan Ware pointed out
twenty years ago, one of the main effects of this increased cost over
time has been to diminish the role of parties relative to that of the individual candidate raising money and directing her own political for114
These developments have entailed high incumbent reelectunes.
115
tion rates, beginning in the l960s and rising steadily over the years,
116
along with a stark decline over time in party identification.
The significance of incumbency and incumbency politics, in what
may be fairly called a post-party age, gave rise in the last decade to a
robust, nationwide term limits movement predicated on the notion
117
The
that incumbents had a stranglehold on political competition.
Court was well familiar with these “realities,” having been called upon
to adjudicate the constitutionality of the nationwide drive toward con118
The Court also had experience
gressional term limits in Thornton.
with the increasingly sophisticated management of political competition for the House, accomplished through computer-aided gerryman119
dering and limiting the range of competitive races.
114

ALAN WARE, THE BREAKDOWN OF DEMOCRATIC PARTY ORGANIZATION, 19401980, at 175-76 (l985).
115
Id. at 146-47.
116
See THOMAS E. PATTERSON, THE VANISHING VOTER: PUBLIC INVOLVEMENT IN AN
AGE OF UNCERTAINTY 24-25 (2002)(detailing the decline of party-centered politics and
the rise of candidate, rather than party, identification within the electorate).
117
See, e.g., JOHN FUND & JAMES COYNE, CLEANING HOUSE: AMERICA’S CAMPAIGN
FOR TERM LIMITS, at xix (1992) (examining the tradition of term limits and concluding
that they can be a method of “reviving political competition and making legislatures
more responsive to and representative of the people”); GEORGE F. WILL, RESTORATION:
CONGRESS, TERM LIMITS AND THE RECOVERY OF DELIBERATIVE DEMOCRACY, at xix
(1992) (tracing the history of term limits movements and arguing in favor of term limits).
118
U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 514 U.S. 779 (1995). It bears mention that
Justice Stevens, joint author with Justice O’Connor of McConnell, wrote the majority
decision in Thornton holding state imposed Congressional term limits unconstitutional.
Unlike his opinion in McConnell, Justice Stevens decided Thornton on broad constitutional principles with no mention of the “political realities” shaping states’ adoption of
term limits. Cf. Colorado Republican II, 533 U.S. at 451-452, 452 n.14 (stating that the
Court had “long recognized Congress’s concern with [the] reality of political life” that
“[p]arties are . . . necessarily the instruments of some contributors whose object is . . .
to support a specific candidate for the sake of a position on one narrow issue, or even
to support any candidate who will be obliged to the contributors”).
119
See Easley v. Cromartie, 532 U.S. 234, 237 (2001) (evaluating the methodology
behind the creation of an irregularly shaped majority-black district in North Carolina);
Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630, 635-36 (1993) (examining two unusually shaped, majorityblack districts in North Carolina); see generally Vieth v. Jubelirer, 158 L. Ed. 2d 546
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In an opinion devoted to an explication of political reality, this reality, bearing directly on the Court’s theory of deference, merited as
much emphasis as the “subtle” effects of money on the legislative process. While the theory of “deference” is specifically conditioned on
sensitivity to such “constitutional evils as, say, permitting incumbents
120
to insulate themselves from effective electoral challenge,” McConnell
fails altogether to seriously consider what Samuel Issacharoff and
Richard Pildes refer to as this “background structure of partisan com121
petition.” The Court in McConnell, merely nodding in the direction
of these issues, chose to emphasize one aspect of political reality—the
standing concern with fundraising—to the exclusion of a more integrated assessment of the operation of the political market.
This is another way in which the commitment to Buckley’s anticorruption rationale framework limits the Court’s field of vision, eventually undermining the credibility of its appeal to “deference.” The focus on corruption draws the Court’s attention away from a more
extensive inquiry into the political market. Narrowing the Court’s focus, it also screens from the Court’s view other aspects of political reality that would justify judicial supervision of the regulation of politics.
Issacharoff and Pildes call for courts to assess campaign finance reform “intensively to ensure they do not further entrench bipartisan
122
Yet it is difficult to see how courts could dispolitical lockups.”
charge this responsibility under a corruption-centered theory of deference like the one constructed in McConnell.
D. The Court’s Treatment of BCRA’s Legislative History
The Court in McConnell offers the surprising observation that
123
there is “little legislative history regarding BCRA generally.” To the
extent that this statement is correct, it would provoke concerns about

(2004) (considering a claim of partisan gerrymandering and finding it nonjusticiable);
MARK MONMONIER, BUSHMANDERS AND BULLWINKLES: HOW POLITICIANS MANIPULATE
ELECTRONIC MAPS AND CENSUS DATA TO WIN ELECTIONS (2001) (examining the ways
in which district boundaries “can serve or disadvantage political parties, incumbents,
and racial or ethnic groups”).
120
Shrink Missouri, 528 U.S. at 402.
121
Samuel Issacharoff & Richard H. Pildes, Politics as Markets: Partisan Lockups of
the Democratic Process, 50 STAN. L. REV. 643, 648, 670 (l998). Pildes and Issacharoff
place their emphasis on examination of political “realities” in lieu of “mechanical legal
formalisms” to address the partisan lockup of the political process. Id. at 652, 660.
122
Id. at 689.
123
McConnell, 124 S. Ct. at 681. See also supra text accompanying note 86 (noting
the McConnell Court’s dismissive approach to the legislative history of BCRA).
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any theory of deference, which should include some reasonable expectation that elected officials would declare and explain their purposes. There is, however, significant BCRA legislative history, but the
Court pays it little attention, citing legislative history on relatively
124
The Court resolutely
modest issues of statutory interpretation.
avoids any larger-scale engagement with the legislative history in the
assessment of what the Buckley Court referred to as the “full sweep of
125
the legislation as enacted.”
Justice Scalia in his dissent brings out some of what the majority
overlooks. Namely, Justice Scalia provides considerable commentary
from the House and Senate floors about the personal disdain for
“attack ads” behind members’ support for the Title II “electioneering
126
The Court’s disregard for Congress’s debate on
communications.”
BCRA goes further still, ranging over Title I and the statute as a whole.
The legislative history that the majority derides as “little” includes extensive debate about the enactment of protections against millionaire
spending, or increased “hard money” limits, and about the purposes
to serve the interests, or address the anxieties, of incumbents. In addressing the Millionaire’s Amendment, Senator McCain, one of the
two key sponsors of the bill and a supporter of the amendment, was
blunt in describing the motives of his colleagues:
So [the Millionaire’s Amendment] addresses, in all candor, a concern
that virtually any nonmillionaire Member of this body has, and that is
that they wake up some morning and pick up the paper and find out
that some multi-millionaire is going to run for their seat, and that person
intends to invest 3, 5, 8, 10, now up to $70 million of their own money in
127
order to win.

Expressing skepticism, both the Democratic Leader and the ranking Democratic Member of the Rules Committee noted that the plain
128
The measure
effect of the measure was “incumbent protection.”
passed comfortably, with the support of the bill’s sponsors and on a

124

See, e.g., id. at 684 n.71 (citing Senator Feingold’s statement regarding the ability of federal candidates to appear in the advertisements of state candidates for the
purpose of endorsing them).
125
Buckley, 424 U.S. at 31 n.33.
126
McConnell, 124 S. Ct. at 727-28 (Scalia, J., dissenting); see also Brief for Appellants The National Rifle Association, et al., at 50 app. McConnell v. FEC (no. 02-1675)
(quoting from BCRA’s legislative history).
127
147 CONG. REC. S2540 (daily ed. Mar. 20, 2001) (statement of Sen. McCain)
(emphasis added).
128
147 CONG. REC. S2542 (daily ed. Mar. 20, 2001) (statement of Sen. Dodd); 147
CONG. REC. S2542, 2544 (daily ed. Mar. 20, 2001) (statement of Sen. Daschle).
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bipartisan basis. Similar expressions of incumbents’ attention to their
own welfare surfaced with the introduction of a successful amendment
to increase the contribution limits for candidates. The sponsors cited
many of the same considerations they found persuasive for banning
“attack ads,” such as the dangers of “independent groups totally taking
129
Their argument also included an appeal to the advantage,
over.”
associated with increased limits, of reducing the “incessant need for
130
fundraising.”
Not all of these concerns, such as the demands for “incessant
fundraising,” were constitutionally suspect as a basis for supporting
congressional action. Yet a reading of the legislative history reveals
that once the original bill was presented to the floor, it became the
subject of adjustment in substantial part on the basis of self-interest. A
number of members became uneasy over the spectacle of the Senate
taking up a reform bill, only to immediately amend it to provide more
131
fundraising potential and flexibility for themselves.
These comments are all the more notable when considered in the
light of the Senate’s and House’s varied and inconclusive efforts at articulating a generally shared view of what the bill was designed to accomplish. Different members argued at different times that the bill
132
would provide for “equality” in the political process, help to reduce
133
the total amount of money in the political process, reduce the fund134
raising demands on federal officials, and limit negative campaign135
Both Democratic and Republican members rejected any suging.
gestion that the bill was required to address actually corrupt conduct,

129

147 CONG. REC. S3006 (daily ed. Mar. 28, 2001) (statement of Sen. Thomp-

son).
130

147 CONG. REC. S3012 (daily ed. Mar. 28, 2001) (statement of Sen. Feinstein).
See, e.g., 147 CONG. REC. S2463 (daily ed. Mar. 19, 2001) (statement of Sen.
Levin) (“So the first amendment that comes before the Senate is an amendment which
is written in a way to eliminate any limit.”).
132
148 CONG. REC. H342 (daily ed. Feb. 13, 2002) (statement of Rep. Lewis).
133
See 147 CONG. REC. S2932 (daily ed. Mar. 27, 2001) (statement of Sen. Dodd)
(“[A]ll of these amendment[s] are just opening up more spigots, allowing more
money to flow into a process that is already nauseatingly awash in too much money.”).
134
See 147 CONG. REC. S3012 (daily ed. Mar. 28, 2001) (statement of Sen. Feinstein) (arguing that the amendment would “reduce the incessant need for fundraising”).
135
See, e.g., 147 CONG. REC. S2692 (daily ed. Mar 22, 2001) (statement of Sen. Wyden) (introducing an amendment to limit negative campaigning).
131
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because they agreed that they were not responsible for any. In fact,
Senator Feingold advised his colleagues that they were required to cite
corruption, regardless of whether it existed, to satisfy the demands of
137
The diversity of views and rationales was such
the Buckley Court.
that, after Senator Specter introduced an amendment with a “findings” section, in order “to provide a factual basis to uphold the consti138
tutionality of the statute,” he subsequently was compelled to with139
draw it when agreement proved impossible.
The Court’s disinclination to delve into this legislative history is
evident. When reviewing the justification for BCRA, the Court devotes most of its discussion to the expert testimony presented in the
proceedings below, and to the findings of the members of the three140
judge court who did not agree among themselves on key issues. To
the extent that Congress’s formal intention is cited, reference is made
to the Report of the Governmental Affairs Committee on its investiga141
tion of presidential campaign practices, which was issued three years
before and not mentioned at all on the floor of the Senate during the
first week of debate on BCRA.
Congress’s varied and sometimes confused record of its purposes,
not to mention the evidence of self-interestedness that was the topic of
candid discussion on the floor, may not have been sufficient to doom
the constitutional character of its enactment. Still, the Court seemed
sufficiently uncomfortable with this history to minimize its significance and sidestep any serious discussion of the issues it raised, while
still holding to the proposition that Congress’s will in this matter merited respect. This is a troubling feature of a decision committed to a
notion of judicial deference. The difficulty follows from the Court’s
construction of a theory of deference on the basis of historical and
136

147 CONG. REC. S2936 (daily ed. Mar. 27, 2001) (statement of Sen. Wellstone);
see 147 CONG REC. S2438 (daily ed. Mar. 19, 2001) (statement of Sen. McConnell)
(commending the lack of unsubstantiated charges of corruption).
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See 147 CONG. REC. S2444 (daily ed. Mar. 19, 2001) (statement of Sen. Feingold). The corruption standard also was subjected to some creative interpretation,
such as the claim that perceptions of corruption were created somehow by the constitutional right of millionaires to finance their own campaigns without limitation. 147
CONG. REC. S2538 (daily ed. Mar. 20, 2001) (statement of Sen. DeWine).
138
147 CONG. REC. S3118 (daily ed. Mar. 29, 2001) (statement of Sen. Specter).
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147 CONG. REC. S3120 (daily ed. Mar. 29, 2001) (statement of Sen. Specter).
140
See McConnell, 124 S. Ct. at 649-653 (reviewing the history and purposes of
BCRA).
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Id. at 652-54 (citing SENATE COMM. ON GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS, INVESTIGATION OF ILLEGAL OR IMPROPER ACTIVITIES IN CONNECTION WITH 1996 FEDERAL ELECTION CAMPAIGNS, S. REP. NO. 105-167, 105th Cong. (1998)).
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empirical claims that do not withstand close scrutiny. The history,
“political realities,” and legislative expertise cited by the Court as
grounds for deference could not benefit from close scrutiny of the actual process by which BCRA was considered and enacted. So the
Court set that legislative history aside.
CONCLUSION
If there is a case for deference to the legislature on matters of
campaign finance, it is not found in McConnell. The version it offers
lacks coherence and persuasiveness. This article has located the fault
in the Court’s conflicted treatment of Buckley—its desire to escape
Buckley’s limitations through a theory of deference, and the deleterious effects on that theory of a continued, albeit weakened, commitment to the Buckley framework. Buckley has long haunted campaign
finance reform, but in its strong version, it drew some manageable
and relatively clear lines. In its compromised form today, it cannot
hold its place as a meaningful framework for campaign finance regulation. The doctrine of deference articulated by the Court will not
help the Court navigate around Buckley. In fact, McConnell “deference” is not the solution, but rather an illustration of the continuing
problem with Buckley jurisprudence in its twilight.

